PHILIPPINE POLITICAL CULTURE: 1970*

Jose P. de Jesus and Jose C. Benitez

Introduction

Recent developments in social science have sought to integrate into a coherent framework the different theoretical positions of different social scientists and social critics into a commonly acceptable framework, which would permit one to study political systems comparatively and scientifically (Wiseman 1966).

While theoretical refinements and elaborations are still being developed and discussed, and while the limitations of systems models are being brought to light, the prevailing orientation is the acceptance of the systems model approach as the approach most amenable to the study of the political system.

Without going into the theoretical difficulties and limitations of the systems approach as applied to political behavior and to the study of politics, though keeping them in mind in the analysis of our data, it would be appropriate to explain briefly the systems approach as applied to political science.

It should be pointed out at this point that the "political systems analysis" the social scientist is dealing with is an analytical system, and as such should not be confused as identical with the concrete political entity.

The basic scheme for the systems approach to the political system, as developed by David Easton (1965a, 1965b), may be simplified and represented diagramatically as in Figure 1.

Conceptually, the systems analysis of the polity consists of three basic elements: the political system—which consists of the authoritative allocation of values in the society, the inputs, the outputs; the environment; and the feedback process.

The inputs are grouped according to demands and supports. Demands provide the raw material or information which the system must process, and the energy needed by the system. Supports, on the other hand, consist of the energy in the form of actions or orientations (states of mind) which promote or resist a political system or the demands and decisions which are needed to keep the system running.

The outputs are the decisions and policies made by the system. The environment are the other systems which impinge on the political system, such as the economic and the ecological.[1]

The general notion, therefore, is that conceptually it is possible to identify the demands made on the system, the support such demands have, both of which serve as the inputs which

Fig. 1 – Simplified model of the political system (Easton 1965a, 1965b)

the political system must process and convert into the outputs. The box in the diagram reflects the conversion process of the system.[2]

From this rather simplified model it is clear that the effectiveness and success of the conversion process presupposes, among other things, a correct identification and definition of the nature of the inputs before converting them into outputs.

Political culture

One effective way of studying the nature of the inputs that a system must process is to look at what Almond and Verba (1963) have referred to as the "political culture." Political culture refers to the orientation among the members of a nation toward the political system–towards role incumbents, towards political policies, towards political objects within the system. Orientation toward the political system includes: (1) *cognitive* orientation, that is, amount of information and beliefs about the political system, its functions and functionaries, its inputs and its outputs; (2) *affective* orientation, or feelings, about the political system, its roles and incumbents of these roles, and its performance; and (3) *evaluative* orientation, i.e., "judgment and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and

feelings" (Almond and Verba 1963:15). By measuring these three aspects of political culture we can begin to form a picture of the nature of support and the extent of legitimacy a given political system maintains at any given time, or, if we accept the Almond-Verba notion of cultural stages, the level of political acculturation or development of a given society.

From this more or less rarified atmosphere of political theory, we have sought to measure empirically what we considered critical elements of the Philippine political culture, in order to ascertain the nature of political inputs and thereby provide the analytical perspective needed with regard to the inquiry into the probable sources of social unrest.

One important question one may ask about the political culture is this: What is the pattern of distribution of the political culture in the society? Are there observable variations in political orientation and are these variations systematically distributed among identifiable sectors of the society?

Conceivably, political culture may vary along several dimensions. These dimensions could be, for example, racial, religious, linguistic, occupational, generational, or socio-economic. Our purpose in this paper is empirically to relate observable variations in political culture with socio-economic status (SES). More specifically,

we seek to answer the following questions: Is membership in a particular socio-economic status (SES) more or less related to one's orientation toward the political system? Or, stated differently, are there SES-based differences in the way people perceive and judge the political system and the various objects within the system?

This is neither the place nor the occasion to go into the ongoing debate and controversy as to what constitutes social class (see Dahrendorf 1959, esp. Chs. I, III). As used in this study, social class (or more accurately, SES) has been defined on the basis of the reported observations of interviewers according to a criterion of household classification (see Figure 2). Households were classified on the basis of the observed standard of living of the family as determined by four main factors: furnishings, house appearance and construction, the people, and the grounds and neighborhood.[3]

One may ask at this point: Why raise these questions at all? In other words, may one legitimately expect meaningful variations in political orientation to be associated with membership in a particular socio-economic status?

We need not go into a detailed discussion of all the recent scientific studies of social class both in this country and in other parts of the world. Suffice it to say that social class, as variously defined, has been demonstrated again and again to be a major influence on people's perceptions, decisions, and social actions. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that it should have a major influence on political behavior as well.

The principal variables that we sought to examine in this study may be stated in terms of the following groups of questions:

1. What are the people's perceptions about conditions of life in the country today? Where does the average Filipino think he and the nation stand at present, in the past, and in the future?

2. What amount of political information does he have concerning certain government programs, sepcifically, land reform and peace and order?

3. What are his beliefs and feelings about his relationship with the government? Does he see himself as a participant in governmental decision-making or does he feel alienated?

4. What are his more or less considered judgments about governmental performance and the performance of government officials? What are his expectations of treatment at the hands of government officials?

5. Finally, is he inclined to support radical politics?

In attempting to answer these questions, we shall examine probable variations in the patterns of responses according to the different SES groupings, against which we shall present the nationwide picture.

Sample and Sampling Procedure

This report is based on a nationwide sample of 2,808 respondents who were interviewed in their households between February 26 and March 10, 1970, with the use of a questionnaire. The interviews were conducted in about one-hour sessions in the mother tongue of the interviewee.

Of the 2,808 respondents, 44 per cent are students and 56 per cent non-students; those interviewed are from urban (including Greater Manila), semi-urban, and rural areas throughout the country. Because of the original purpose of the study, there was an over-sampling of students and an under-sampling of rural respondents. However, in computing the percentages for the nationwide data, the proper weights were applied in order to present as closely as possible a nationwide picture. Since our interest in this papers in intercategory, or interlevel, differences, the sample weightings have been eliminated here.

Results

Perceived conditions of life

The first aspects of political culture that we looked at were the people's perceptions regarding general life conditions—their own estimate of how they think they and the nation stand at present, and where they think they and the nation will stand in the "next few years." We also obtained an estimate of how they think they themselves personally stood in the past.

To do this, we utilized a modified version of a technique invented by Hadley Cantril (1965) called the "Self-Anchoring Striving Scale," a projective technique which permits the researcher to measure people's expectations (aspirations in Cantril's terms) according to their own subjective references, rather than to an externally imposed criterion.

In the interview, use is made of an 11-point ladder scale (0–10), and the respondent is instructed to think of the best possible condition or state of affairs as on the 10th step, and the worst possible on Step 0. He is asked to judge on what step he would locate, for instance, himself—at present, in the past, or in the future.

Respondents were asked to estimate how they personally stood in the past, how they (and the nation) stood at the present time, and where they thought they (and the nation) would be a few years from now. Responses to these questions have been cross-tabulated according to SES levels.[4]

While some differences may be noted in the respective ratings given by the different SES groupings regarding present *personal* life conditions, the general picture that emerges is that, whereas the present is perceived as only slightly better than the past, the future (with weighted averages of 8.11, 7.65, and 6.82 for high, medium, and low SES groups, respectively) is generally seen as significantly better relative to the present. The *difference* in ladder steps between the future and the present ranges from

2.69 ladder steps (for the high SES) to 2.93 ladder steps (for the low SES).

With respect to the perceived state of the nation, there is a slight expectation of improvement in the future over the present, but the difference in *national* ladder ratings between the present and the future is much less than the difference in present-versus-future *personal* ladder ratings.

Perceived chances of attaining expected step

If people expect a brighter future both for themselves and for the nation, how do they evaluate the chances that such expectations will be realized? Or are these reported expectations nothing more than empty wishes which the respondents do not really anticipate realizing?

Regarding personal expectations, we asked our respondents the following question: "You said that you expect to reach Step (No.) a few years from now. How would you describe your chances of reaching this step?"

Over 35 per cent of the high SES group as against 26 per cent of the medium- and 20 per cent of the low-SES groups evaluate the chances of attaining the expected step as "Very Good." Slightly over 11 per cent of the *Lows* as against 6 per cent of the *Mediums* and 4 per cent of the *Highs* see the chances of attainment as "Poor"; and 9 per cent of the *Lows* as against 4 per cent each of the *Highs* and *Mediums*, said they did not know.

When response categories are combined, we find that 92 per cent of the *Highs*, 89 per cent of the *Mediums*, and 77 per cent of the *Lows* evaluate the chances of attaining their personal aspirations as either "Good" or "Very Good"; while 5 per cent of the *Highs*, 8 per cent of the *Mediums*, and 13 per cent of the *Lows* see the chances as either "Poor" or "Very Poor."

In general, as one might expect, compared to the high- and medium- SES groups, the *Lows* have a significantly greater proportion of respondents who perceive the chances of attain-

ing their personal aspirations as either poor or simply indeterminate. The differences are statistically significant (chi-square test; $p < 0.001$).

Consider now the perceived chances that the nation would attain the predicted step. We asked the question: "You said you think the Philippines will be on Step. *(No.)* a few years from now. How would you describe the chances that our country will reach this step?"

The main point of difference among the three SES groups is this: significantly more of the *Lows* (10 per cent, compared to the *Highs'* and the *Mediums'* 5 per cent each) perceive the country's chances of attaining the predicted step as indeterminate. Again, the differences are statistically significant (chi-square test; $p < 0.001$).

What is perhaps interesting is to compare the perceived chances of attaining *personal* aspirations as against the perceived chances of attaining *national* aspirations. For all SES categories, people by and large evaluate their own chances of attaining their personal aspirations as much better than those of the nation. The high-SES group shows the greatest discrepancy in their evaluation of personal vs. national chances, and the low-SES group the lowest. This could imply that the high-SES group see their own personal welfare as more independent of the welfare of the state than do the low-SES respondents.

The apparent absence of correspondence between personal and national expectations seems to suggest a lack of identification of the individual's own personal aspirations with those of the nation. As pointed out elsewhere, if such be the case, "one can expect to find that few people would be interested in or concerned about the system as a whole; that few would be concerned about how their behavior affects the system; and that most would be more anxious about how to survive in the system than about trying to improve that system" (Keane 1970).

Level of political awareness

The second dimension of political culture that we wanted to assess was the extent of citizen awareness about certain important aspects of the governmental process. This is based on the assumption that effective citizenship and political participation are based on some degree of awareness of significant events and activities involved in the political process.[5]

Our first object was to pick certain aspects of the political process which could be assumed to be sufficiently important in the political life of the people and which a large majority could be reasonably expected to be aware of. Two of the items which we believed met these criteria were the Government's land reform and peace-and-order programs.

Apart from the specific content of their knowledge about these items (which is the object of a separate analysis), do the people at least know about the government's programs on land reform and peace and order? What we were probing for was a minimum level of awareness on the part of the citizenry regarding these aspects of political life.

On land reform, we asked the following question: "What, if anything, have you read or heard about the land reform program of the government?"[6] As might be expected, the low-SES group showed the lowest level of awareness, while the *Highs* exhibited the highest level of awareness about land reform. Over 47 per cent of the *Highs*, about 40 per cent of the *Mediums*, and about 30 per cent of the *Lows* have read or heard about land reform. Compared to the nationwide sample, the *Lows* exhibited a lower level of awareness about land reform: 30 per cent for the *Lows* vs. 35 per cent for the nation. Interlevel differences are significant (chi-square test; $p < 0.001$).

The next question we asked attempted to assess people's awareness of the government's efforts to maintain peace and order throughout the country. We asked the question: "What, if anything, have you read or heard about the government's efforts to maintain peace and order in our country?" Overall, 39 per cent of the people had read or heard something about the

government's efforts to maintain peace and order, and 61 per cent knew nothing about it.

The high-SES subjects again came out as the most aware of the government's efforts to maintain peace and order; the low-SES respondents, as the least aware.

The general picture that seems to emerge from these findings is that on the basis of the nationwide sample, only about 40% knew anything about the land reform and peace-and-order programs of the government. When broken down into the different SES categories, the low-SES group turned out to be the least informed, about 6 percentage points behind the nationwide sample.

Sense of political competence

The third aspect of political culture that we examined was the citizens' sense of political efficacy or competence, by which we mean the degree to which the individual citizen *subjectively* feels that he can constructively relate to and influence the political system, and that he counts in the total equation of political and governmental decision-making. Our exploration of this concept springs from the view, shared by others, that, given a democratic framework, actual citizen involvement and participation in the political process is contingent upon some degree of political competence on the part of the citizens (see, for example, Campbell *et al.* 1964, Rosenberg 1957, Eulau and Schneider 1956).

Earlier in the interview, we asked our respondents what, in their view, were the major problems facing the country. The answers have been reported elsewhere (de Jesus and Benitez 1970). We then asked them the question: "What can people like you do to help solve these problems?"

The responses to this question are analyzable in terms of content and in terms of whether the respondent says he can do something (no matter what) as against his saying he can do nothing. For this report, we have used the latter data.

Of the high-SES group, 68 per cent said they could do something, 14 per cent said they could do nothing, and 18 per cent did not know one way or the other. Of the medium-SES respondents, 65 per cent said they could do something, 15 per cent admitted they could do nothing, and 20 per cent didn't know. Finally, of the low-SES group, 46 per cent felt they could do something, 24 per cent said they could do nothing, and 30 per cent didn't know. It is evident that of our three SES groups, the *Lows* had the highest proportion of subjects who either felt they could do nothing about helping solve the nation's problems, or simply didn't know whether they could do anything or not. The differences are statistically significant (chi-square test; $p < 0.001$).

The next question we asked along the same dimensions attempted to assess people's belief in their ability to influence the course of governmental decisions. We asked our respondents: "Suppose again that people like you were to suggest some action for the government to undertake which you think would benefit the people; do you think the government would seriously consider your suggestion . . . or would the government simply ignore it?"

Again the low-SES group had the smallest proportion of respondents who expect their suggestions to be seriously considered (30 per cent) and the biggest proportion of individuals who expect their suggestions to be ignored (45 per cent). As measured by this question, the *Lows* tailed behind the nationwide sample by about 5 percentage points in feelings of competence.

The medium-SES group had the biggest proportion of subjects who felt their suggestions would be seriously considered (37 per cent). The differences in response patterns among the three SES groups are significant (chi-square test; $p < 0.001$).

The next two questions we asked attempted to measure the citizen's feelings of alienation or powerlessness in relation to the political system.[6] The first of these was: "The government is run by a few people in power and there is not much

that the average citizen can do about it. Do you agree . . . or disagree with this statement?"

Of the nationwide sample, more than half of the total number of respondents (55 per cent) believed or partly believed that the government was run by a few people and that there was not much that the average citizen could do about it; only slightly over 38 per cent believed or partly believed the opposite. The *Lows* had a higher percentage of "alienates" than the *Highs* and *Mediums* but the intergroup differences are not statistically significant.

The other question we asked was: "The Government does not really care what people like me think. Do you agree . . . or disagree with this statement?"

Again, a similar pattern of responses was observed, with the *Lows* having the biggest proportion of people who felt that the government did not really care what people thought, and the *Highs*, the smallest. The differences are not significant, however.

From the political-competence data we have just presented, the following statements may be made: First, a sizable majority of the respondents in the high- and medium-SES categories felt that they could do something to help solve the problems of the nation; while a similar proportion of the low-SES group either felt that they could do nothing or didn't know one way or the other. Second, about 35 per cent of the total number of respondents believed that their suggestions would be seriously considered by the government, while 41 per cent felt that they would be ignored. The low-SES group had the smallest proportion (30 per cent) of respondents who felt that their suggestions would be seriously considered, and the biggest proportion of subjects (45 per cent) who believed that their suggestions would be ignored. Third, slightly more than 50 per cent of all the respondents believed that the government was run by a few people in power, that the individual citizen could do nothing about it, and that the government did not really care what people thought. However, observed differences among the three

SES groups on this question were not statistically significant.

Evaluation of system performance

We turn next to the evaluative aspects of the political culture.

The survival and stability of a democratic political system has been said to depend upon its effectiveness and legitimacy. That is to say, it must provide an adequate level of citizen satisfactions so that the citizens do not turn against it, and the citizens must accept it as the proper political regime *per se*.[7] In order to discover the people's feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with system performance, we focused on three objects of the political system: (1) performance of government officials in general, (2) people's expectation of treatment at the hands of government officials, and (3) belief in the fairness of the courts of justice.

Evaluation of government officials. We turn first to the people's opinion regarding the performance of their government officials. Having asked them to enumerate what they considered to be the most important problems currently facing the nation, we wanted to determine how our respondents viewed their government official's performance in relation to these problems. The first question we asked was: "Do you think our government officials are aware of and understand these problems?"

About 77 per cent of all our respondents believed that government officials were aware of and understood the problems of the country; about 13 per cent did not believe so; and about 7 per cent didn't know. A little over 2 per cent refused to answer the question.

Some variations may be noted in the pattern of responses among the three SES groups. Compared to the high- and medium-SES groups, the *Lows* had a smaller proportion of positive responses and a greater proportion of "Don't Know" answers. The differences are statistically significant (chi-square test; $p < 0.001$).

We then asked our respondents: "In your

opinion, are our government officials doing something positive to help solve these problems?"

The response of the people to this question is quite positive. Nationwide, a majority of them (55 per cent) believed that our government officials were doing something positive to help solve the problems of the nation; more than a quarter of them (26 per cent) did not think so, and the rest either didn't know (17 per cent) or gave no response (2 per cent). What is worth noting, however, is that, whereas about 77 per cent of our respondents believed that our government officials were aware of and understood the problems of the nation (see above), only about 55 per cent felt that they were doing something about solving these problems.

The pattern of variations in the responses to this question among the three SES groups is similar to those presented above. The Lows gave the lowest evaluation of the performance of government officials and had the biggest proportion of "Don't Know" responses. Again, the differences are significant (chi-square test; $p <$ 0.01).

Finally, we asked the question: "Compared to, say, five years ago, do you think our government officials have done something to improve the living conditions of people like you? "

A similar pattern of responses may again be observed. Of the nationwide sample, about 66 per cent believed that government officials were doing better now than five years ago, almost 24 per cent disagreed, and about 10 per cent didn't know. The Lows again gave the smallest proportion of positive answers and the largest of "Don't Know" responses. However, it will be noted that even among the Lows almost 60 per cent believed that government officials were doing a better job now than five years ago.

Summarizing respondent evaluation of government officials, two statements may be made: First, among the three SES groups, the Highs generally gave the most favorable evaluation of the performance of government officials, and the Lows, the least favorable; the mediums were

in between. Second, the Lows had the biggest proportion of "Don't Know" responses, compared to the Highs and the Mediums. As we have already pointed out, all differences are significant.

Expectations of treatment at the hands of government officials. We turn next to the people's expectations of treatment at the hands of government officials. When an individual citizen has to deal directly with some instrumentality of the government, does he expect to be attended to? Or does he expect to be ignored? Among the questions we asked our respondents was the following: "Suppose you were to file a complaint against an abusive or corrupt policeman or government official, do you think you would be given proper attention?"

Of the nationwide sample, half (50 per cent) of our respondents said they expected to be given proper attention, more than a quarter (27 per cent) said they did not expect to be attended to, a little over 8 per cent said it depended, and about 14 per cent didn't know.

When the three SES groups are compared, 44 per cent of the Highs, 47 per cent of the Mediums and 45 per cent of the Lows answered "Yes" to the question. The proportion of those who answered "No" is almost evenly matched among the three groups with the Mediums having a slightly bigger proportion: 34 per cent for the Mediums compared to 32 per cent for the Highs and 31 per cent for the Lows.

The response categories in which the three SES groups varied greatly are the "Others" and "Don't Know" responses. Compared to the Mediums and the Lows, the Highs had a significantly greater proportion of respondents who said "It depends" while the Lows had a much bigger proportion of "Don't know" responses, compared to the Highs and the Lows. These differences are statistically significant (chi-square test; $p < 0.001$).

Expectations of fair trial. The other question we asked had to do with the people's belief in the fairness of our courts of justice. We asked

our respondents: "Suppose a member of your family were accused in court of an offense that you know he did not commit. Do you think he would be given a fair trial?"

Nationwide, more than 54 per cent of our respondents expressed positive expectations of a fair trial for the accused person, about 15 per cent said they didn't know, and a little over 8 per cent said "It depends."

Comparing the three SES groups, we found that the *Lows* had the lowest proportions of respondents who expressed positive expectations of a fair trial and the biggest proportion of "Don't know" responses. About 51 per cent of this group, as against about 56 per cent each for the high- and the medium-SES groups, believed that an accused person could expect to be given a fair trial; and about 16 per cent of the *Lows*, as against about 9 per cent of the *Highs* and 11 per cent of the *Mediums* did not know whether or not an accused individual would be given a fair trial.

A sizable proportion of respondents believed that whether or not an accused member of the family would obtain a fair trial depended on certain considerations. The response of a 27-year old housewife from Cavite typifies this response category: "It depends; if a politician will help you, you will get a fair trial." Or the answer of a 19-year old young man from Tacloban, who said: "It depends on the position or standing of the person accused."

Interestingly enough, the high-SES subjects led the other two groups in the proportion of respondents giving the "It depends" response: over 12 per cent of the *Highs*, as against about 8 and 9 per cent of the *Mediums* and *Lows*, respectively.

Support for "Radical Politics"

The last aspect of culture that we sought to examine deals more directly with the degree of support that the established system of government enjoys among the citizens or, conversely, with the extent of citizen opposition to the

system, or the support for what we have referred to as "radical politics."

About midway in our interview, we asked our respondents the following question: "Some people say that what is needed is not a revision of our Constitution but rather a complete change in our form of government. Do you agree . . . or disagree with this view?"

Comparing the three SES groups, it can be noted that over 60 per cent of the high-SES group, as against 32 per cent each for the medium- and low-SES groups, disagreed with the statement. Realizing the limitations imposed by the possible ambiguity of the phrase, "a complete change in our form of government," this means that we can expect to find the strongest support for the *status quo* from the high-SES group and the weakest from the low-SES group. The medium-SES group falls roughly in between these two.

A significant category is the "Don't know" category. More than a quarter (26 per cent) of the low-SES group, compared to about 10 and 16 per cent of the high- and the medium-SES groups, respectively, were not committed to either a complete change in the established system of government or to a revision of our Constitution.

Knowing the extent of differential support for, and opposition to, the established form of government, we wondered how the people viewed the forthcoming Constitutional Convention. Did they believe that it would help solve some of the problems that they perceived as important? We asked our respondents the following question: "From what you know or have heard about the coming Constitutional Convention, do you think it will help solve some of these problems?"

The high-SES group again showed the highest proportion of respondents who believed that the Constitutional Convention would help solve the nation's problems; the low-SES group, the lowest. The middle group, as before, fell somewhere in between in terms of proportion of positive responses.

It is evident that there is a large proportion of respondents in all three SES groups who gave a "Don't know" response; but by far the largest came from the low-SES respondents. Almost 42 per cent of the low-SES subjects, compared to only about 22 per cent of the high-SES group, gave a "Don't know" answer. This ratio is almost two to one, i.e., for every one respondent from the high-SES group, there were almost two from the low-SES subjects who said they did not know whether the Constitutional Convention would help solve some of the problems of the nation.

In looking at these results, some qualifications are perhaps in order. It must be pointed out that at the time of the interview (between February and March, 1970), awareness about the forthcoming Constitutional Convention was found to be very low. At that time only about 25 per cent of our nationwide sample knew anything about tne Constitutional Convention. Nonetheless, we still found systematic, and very significant, differences in the response patterns of the three SES groups.

The third element that we wanted to explore in relation to this aspect of political culture was the people's belief in peaceful versus violent reforms. At the time of our survey, the choice in the means for bringing about what people thought were necessary changes and reforms in our society seemed to boil down to one of two types, namely, violent or peaceful means. We wanted to get an estimate of the distribution of the beliefs of the people regarding these alternatives.

Earlier, we had asked our respondents what changes and reforms they believed were necessary in the present system of government. Without going into a definition of what was meant by peaceful or violent reforms, we asked our respondents the following question: "In the end, do you think these changes will be brought about peacefully . . . or will they be brought about through violence?"

In the answers we received, two points stand out. First, the *Highs* have the biggest proportion

of respondents who believe that changes and reforms will be brought about peacefully; the *Lows* have the lowest. Second, the *Lows* have the largest proportion of subjects who gave indeterminate or "Don't know" responses. The differences are statistically significant. (chi-square test; $p < 0.001$).

It would appear from these results that, as one might expect, support for peaceful changes is strongest among the high-SES group and weakest among the low-SES respondents. There is, however, a sizable number from all groups who are undecided: about 22–23 per cent for each of the high and medium groups and about 37 per cent for the low-SES subjects.

The last question that we shall deal with in this paper has to do with the belief in the legitimacy of our system of law and order. We wanted to assess the extent of the support for the rule of law among our respondents. The fact that the survival and success of a Constitutional form of government depend on respect for the law stresses the importance of the question. We asked our respondents the following question: "Nowadays it seems better for people to take the law into their own hands rather than wait for the government to do something about improving conditions in the country. Do you agree . . . or disagree with this statement?"

Of the nationwide sample, almost 35 per cent disagree with the statement. Close to 18 per cent partly agree, and 11 per cent partly disagree with it. The rest (7 per cent) give a "Don't know" response. If the responses are collapsed into "agree" and "disagree" categories, we find about the same number of "agree" as "disagree" responses (47 per cent agree vs. 46 per cent disagree).

When the three SES groups are compared, we find no significant differences in the pattern of responses to the question. All three SES categories are about evenly split into 50 per cent "agree" and 50 per cent "disagree."

If one were to very briefly summarize the evidence regarding support for "radical politics;" one could make the following general state-

ments: first, support for the established system of government is strongest among the high-SES group and weakest among the low-SES respondents; second, there is a large proportion of respondents in all SES levels who are uncommitted, but by far the largest of these comes from the low-SES group; third, support for, and opposition to, the established system of law and order is about 50—50, regardless of SES membership.

Summary and Conclusions

We began this paper by presenting a simplified diagram of the systems approach to the study of political behavior. We stated that the effectiveness and success with which the political system can convert the inputs into outputs presupposes, among other things, a correct identification and assessment of the nature of the inputs.

We then argued that one effective way of studying the nature of the inputs that a system must process is to look at the prevailing political culture. By measuring the several aspects of the political culture, we can begin to form a picture of the nature of support (or opposition) and the extent of legitimacy that the political system maintains at any given time or, if we accept the cultural stages notion, the level of political acculturation or development of a given society.

In addition, since as an empirical fact not everybody is equal in the society, at least in socio-economic terms, we wanted to examine how socio-economic inequality was related to political culture.

Within this framework, we sought to assess various aspects of the political culture: (1) the people's perceptions regarding the present, and their expectations about future life conditions both for themselves and for the nation; (2) their level of political awareness, i.e., the amount of information that they possess concerning certain government programs; (3) their sense of political competence, i.e., the degree to which the individual citizen *subjectively* feels that he can constructively relate to and influence the political system; (4) their evaluation of the political

system's performance, which includes the performance of government officials, their expectations of treatment in the hands of government officials, and belief in the fairness of the courts; and (5) the degree of support for "radical politics."

On grounds of the evidence presented in this paper, assuring this evidence to be truly reflective of the political culture, the following summary statements may be made regarding the current state of the Philippine political culture.

1. In general, people perceive their present personal life conditions as slightly better than the past, and expect a significant improvement in the future.

2. With respect to the perceived state of the nation, there is expectation of some improvement in the future over the present, but the difference in *national* ladder ratings between the present and the future is much smaller than the difference in present-versus-future *personal* ladder ratings.

3. People are generally optimistic that they and the nation will attain the predicted ladder steps, but this optimism is more pronounced among the high- and medium-SES subjects than among the low-SES respondents.

4. Only about 40 per cent of our total respondents know anything about the land reform and the peace-and-order programs of the government. Of the three SES groups, the low-SES subjects turn out to be the least informed, more than six percentage points below the nationwide rating.

5. The distribution of the sense of political competence follow the expected pattern. The high- and medium-SES groups show a much higher sense of political competence than the low-SES subjects.

6. Slightly more than half of all the respondents, regardless of SES level, feel that the government is run by a few people in power and the individual citizen can do nothing about it, and that the government does not really care what people think.

7. The citizens' evaluation of the performance of government officials is generally very positive; however, compared to the high-and medium-SES respondents, the low-SES group has a smaller proportion of positive responses and a greater proportion of uncommitted respondents.

8. About half of our nationwide sample say they expect to be given proper attention if they file a complaint with a government office. The other 50 per cent is roughly divided into 27 per cent saying "No," 14 per cent saying they "Do not know," and 8 per cent saying "It depends." Of the three SES groups, the *Highs* have the biggest proportion of "It depends" responses, and the *Lows* the largest number of uncommitted answers.

9. More than 54 per cent of our respondents express positive attitudes toward our courts of justice. The balance is roughly divided into 22 per cent negative, 8 per cent qualified, and 14 per cent "Don't know." Among the three SES groups, the *Lows* have the least proportion of positive feelings about our courts of justice.

10. As one might have expected, support for the established system of government is strongest among the high-SES respondents, followed by the medium-group, and tailed by the low-SES respondents. A very significantly larger proportion of the low-SES subjects are uncommitted to either support or oppose the established political system.

Perhaps one can make a few rather general statements about the evidence presented in this paper. First, there appears to exist within the Philippine polity at least two identifiable levels of political culture—one represented by the high-SES subjects and the other represented by the low-SES respondents. The middle group fails hazily somewhere half-way between these two. Therefore, in trying to analyze and understand the nature of the various types of inputs that the political system must process, one will be well advised to keep this fact in mind.

Second, if the aspects of political culture presented and discussed in this paper are ac-

cepted as indexes of system legitimacy, one can say that the system enjoys relatively greater legitimacy among the high-SES respondents than among the low-SES subjects. For this latter group, the legitimacy of the system still needs further proof.

Finally, the evidence presented in this report represents our best estimate of the state of Philippine political culture at one particular point in time. This imposes certain limitations on the kinds of inferences and interpretations one can safely make about such evidence. To put this evidence in better perspective, we should make a series of separate assessments and readings at different times. From this suggested longitudinal study we should then be able to make a better estimate of where and at what rate the country is going politically.

Notes

[1]For a complete description and analysis of the system approach, see Easton (1965a, 1965b).

[2]For specification of conversion functions and processes see Almond (1965), Easton (1965a, 1965b), and Mitchell (1962).

[3]On this basis, households were classified into A, B, C, and D. For purposes of this report, however, A and B were combined into the "High" category while C and D were called, respectively, "Medium" and "Low" categories.

[4]Included in the text of the paper as delivered in the PSS lecture series were 20 tables. The tables are not reproduced here, since for most readers the text presents the pertinent information in sufficient detail. Copies of the original tables are available on request: please write to Mr. Jose de Jesus, Private Development Corporation of the Philippines, P.O. Box 757, Makati Commercial Center, Makati, Rizal.

[5]For a fuller discussion of the significance of the cognitive dimension in political behavior, see Almond and Verba (1963) and Lipset (1960).

[6]The responses to the question are analyzable in terms of content, as well as in terms of whether the respondent shows and knowledge at all (whatever its content) about the subject asked. This paper deals with the latter type of analysis.

[7]For a detailed discussion of this subject, see Seeman (1949).

APPENDIX A   CLASSIFICATION OF HOMES

The standard of living of a family is used as a basis for classifying homes. The factors that determine the economic classification of a home are enumerated below, in their order of importance. More weight should be given to the first two factors when classifying a home.

Factors	A	B	C	D	X
1) Furnishing	a) Has most, if not all of the luxury accessories like Car, Refrigerator, Piano, Radio or TV set, Kitchen Range, etc. b) Furniture is first class, in good taste, which show an absence of economizing	a) Has the essential accessories like Refrigerator, Radio/TV set, kitchen Range. b) Complete set of furniture, although not the expensive kind.	a) Has, at least, a Radio set; might have an old or second hand TV set or Kitchen Range. b) Furniture is just enough for the family, definitely inexpensive.	a) May not own even a radio set. b) Furniture is not sufficient for the family, consisting mainly of dilapidated or home-made chairs, benches and tables.	This economic classification embraces commercial and business houses such as: Sari-sari store, Barber Shop, Drug Store, Refreshment Parlor, etc. sometimes used as a residence also but more of commercial than residential.
2) House Appearance & Construction.	a) Well-painted. Not in need of repair. b) Permanent, concrete; concrete and wood, or first class wood. c) Usually fenced-in.	a) Painted, although it may need a new coat of paint. May need minor repair work. b) May be permanent structures; wooden, if a house unit. Duplex or higher rent apartment.	a) Needs a coat of paint; needs repair. b) Semi-permanent structure of cheap material. Example: Low-rent apartments or tenement houses.	a) Unpainted, badly in need of repair. b) Temporary structure often made from salvaged materials. Often a barong-barong.	When a house has a small store in it or an adjoining space for business but is more of a home than a business establishment, do not use-"Classification X" but one of the residential home classification (A to D).
3) People	a) Members of the family are well dressed; well educated. At least usually has a servant. b) Successful businessmen, landowner, prominent citizen or professional.	a) Members of the family are neat but not expensively dressed. Usually has a servant. b) Small merchant, middle-level official/employee.	a) Members of the family are dressed inexpensively; rarely college graduates. Generally no servants. b) Minor official/employee.	a) Members of the family are poorly, if not shabbily dressed rarely high school graduates. No servants. b) Laborers, unskilled workers, unemployed.	
4) Grounds & Neighborhood	a) Usually has a well-kept lawn or garden. b) Often, the neighborhood consists of AB homes. Where the neighborhood is mixed, the A homes stand out very clearly.	a) If with surrounding space, it is often with grounds for children to play around. May have a small lawn or garden. b) In the city, Class B is often mixed with Class A homes.	a) Generally has no surrounding space or yard. b) Often mixed with Class D homes.	a) No surrounding space or yard. b) Slums, squatter areas or among ruins situated along esteros, railroad tracks mostly found in clusters.	

[8]See Almond and Verba (1963) and Lipset (1960). For a further discussion of the subject of legitimacy, see Mayo (1960: ch. 4).

References

Almond, G.
1956   Comparative political systems. *In* Political behavior. H. Eulau et al., eds. Glencoe, The Free Press. Pp. 32–42.

Almond, G., and S. Verba
1963   The civic culture. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Campbell, D. et al.
1964   The American voter. New York, Wiley.

Cantril, H.
1965   The pattern of human concerns. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press.

Dahrendorf, R.
1959   Class and conflict in industrial society. Stanford Stanford University Press.

Easton, D.
1965a   A system analysis of political life. New York, Wiley.

1965b   A framework for political analysis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall.

Eulau, H., and P. Schneider
1956   Dimensions of political involvement. Public Opinion Quarterly 20:128–42.

de Jesus, J. P., and J. C. Benitez
1970   Sources of social unrest: a social-psychological study. Manila, Citizenship and Research Foundation, Inc. Mimeo.

Keane, J. T.
1970   Important national problems: some priorities. Manila, National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA). Mimeo.

Lipset, S. M.
1960   Political man. New York, Doubleday.

Mayo, H. B.
1960   Introduction to democratic theory. New York, Oxford University Press.

Mitchell, W. C.
1962   The American polity. New York, The Free Press of Glencoe.

Rosenberg, M.
1954   Some determinants of political apathy. Public Opinion Quarterly 58:349–66.

Seeman, M.
1959   On the meaning of alienation. American Sociological Review 24 (6):783–791.

Wiseman, H. V.
1966   Political systems: some sociological approaches. New York, Praeger.